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WALKING ON A TIGHTROPE: THE DRAFT ECHR ACCESSION 
AGREEMENT AND THE AUTONOMY OF THE EU LEGAL ORDER
TOBIAS LOCK*
1. Introduction
The ongoing negotiations on accession of the European Union to the European 
Convention on Human Rights (“ECHR” or “Convention”) prove to be a dif-
ficult task for the negotiators. Since the accession involves the unusual occur-
rence of a supranational organization signing up to a sophisticated system of 
human rights protection, this does not come as a surprise. Apart from the politi-
cal difficulties of obtaining the consent of forty-seven signatories to the 
Convention and of the EU’s institutions and Member States, the requirements 
of two very different legal orders need to be brought in line. From the point of 
view of European Union law, the most prominent obstacle to an integration of 
the EU into the external supervision mechanism of the Convention is the auton-
omy of the EU legal order. From the very start of the negotiations it has been 
clear that that autonomy, which is jealously policed by the Court of Justice of 
the European Union, would be a major issue for the negotiators. This contribu-
tion is therefore dedicated to the intricacies which the negotiators, and poten-
tially the ECJ, face in this respect. It refers to the different versions of a draft 
agreement published by the informal working group on accession.1 It contains 
a critical analysis of the draft with regard to the autonomy of the EU’s legal 
order but also makes more general comments on whether the proposed solu-
tions would be workable.
2. Background 
The EU is currently not a party to the ECHR. As a consequence, it is not directly 
bound by the human rights guaranteed therein. An accession of the EU to the 
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1. First draft agreement on the accession of the EU to the Convention, CDDH-UE(2011)04; 
(first) revised draft agreement, CDDH-UE(2011)06; (second) revised draft agreement, CDDH-
UE(2011)10.
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Convention has been on the agenda for over thirty years,2 but the technical 
hurdles to it have only recently been removed. The ECHR is now explicitly 
open to an accession by the EU.3 And the new Article 6(2) TEU gives the EU 
not only the competence to sign up to it but at the same time places it under 
an obligation to do so, by stating that “the Union shall accede to the ECHR”. 
Negotiations between the Council of Europe and the EU commenced promptly 
in the summer of 2010.4 An “informal working group” presented a first draft 
agreement in February 20115 and revised versions in March and May 2011.6
 Accession would end the peculiar situation in which the EU finds itself at 
the moment. The EU has become a major actor on the international stage and 
takes pride in its human rights policy.7 Furthermore, respect for human rights 
is one of the conditions for EU membership.8 Thus, the fact that the EU itself 
is not a signatory to any human rights instrument at the moment seriously 
undermines its credibility internationally. By signing up to the ECHR, the EU 
would subject itself to the very standards it requires of others and its own 
legitimacy would be enhanced. More importantly, an accession of the EU to 
the ECHR would close an important gap in the external control exercised by 
the European Court of Human Rights (“ECtHR” or “Strasbourg Court”). It is 
well known that under certain circumstances individuals can hold the Member 
States of the EU responsible for violations of the ECHR before the Strasbourg 
Court. The leading cases in this respect are Matthews and Bosphorus.9 In Mat-
thews, the Strasbourg Court held that the Convention generally allowed the 
Member States to transfer sovereignty to the EU; but where they do so, they 
are responsible to ensure that Convention rights are “secured”. This means that 
where EU law violates the Convention, an individual can hold a Member State 
2. Golsong, “Grundrechtsschutz im Rahmen der Europäischen Gemeinschaften”, (1978) 
Europäische Grundrechtezeitschrift, 346; Commission, Memorandum on the accession of the 
European Communities to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms, Bulletin of the European Communities, Supplement 2/79; cf. the article 
by Jacqué, “The accession of the European Union to the European Convention on Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms”, in this Review.
3. Art. 59(2) ECHR as amended by Protocol 14 to the Convention, which entered into force 
on 1 June 2010.
4. Council of Europe, press release 545(2010), 7 July 2010; the Council of the EU gave the 
Commission a mandate for negotiation on 4 June 2010 with negotiation directives (Doc. 
9689/10), which remain classified.
5. CDDH-UE(2011)04, cited supra note 1.
6. CDDH-UE(2011)06 and CDDH-UE(2011)10, both cited supra note 1.
7. On the EU’s human rights policy in general cf. Eeckhout, External Relations of the Euro-
pean Union (OUP, 2004), p. 465.
8. So-called Copenhagen criteria, cf. Conclusions of the Presidency, European Council 
21–22 June 1993 SN 180/1/93 REV 1. The criteria are now contained in Art. 49 TEU.
9. Matthews v. United Kingdom [GC], Appl. no. 24833/94, ECHR 1999-I; Bosphorus v. Ire-
land [GC], Appl. no. 45036/98, ECHR 2005-VI.
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to account. This stance was generally confirmed in Bosphorus, albeit with a 
twist. Bosphorus concerned the impounding by Irish authorities of an aircraft 
owned by the National Yugoslav Airline but operated by a Turkish airline. An 
EU Regulation aiming at transposing an embargo against Yugoslavia imposed 
by the UN Security Council required the impoundment of Yugoslav aircraft. 
In its decision, the ECtHR confirmed its holding in Matthews but introduced 
an important distinction. While Matthews concerned a violation of the ECHR 
contained in EU primary law, the alleged violation in Bosphorus had its origin 
in a Regulation, i.e. EU secondary law. The ECtHR went on to state its famous 
presumption that as long as an international organization “is considered to 
protect fundamental rights ... in a manner which can be considered at least 
equivalent to that for which the Convention provides” the Court would presume 
that a State has acted in compliance with the Convention where the State had 
no discretion in implementing the legal obligations flowing from its member-
ship of the organization.10 That presumption is, however, rebuttable if the 
protection in the particular case is regarded as “manifestly deficient”.11 The 
ECtHR considered that the human rights protection offered by the European 
Union was equivalent to what the Convention requires. Since Ireland had 
impounded the aircraft on its territory, the ECtHR had no difficulty finding 
that Bosphorus airlines were within its jurisdiction as required by Article 1 
ECHR.
 This case law shows that the Member States can already be held responsible 
in lieu of the EU for violations of the Convention which have their origin in 
EU law. But where the alleged violation of the Convention did not occur within 
the jurisdiction of one of the Member States, the responsibility does not arise. 
This gap in the external supervision by the ECtHR became obvious in the case 
of Connolly.12 Connolly was an employee of the European Commission who 
had been made redundant. He instigated proceedings (a staff case) before the 
Court of First Instance (now: General Court) and then appealed to the ECJ. 
His request to submit written observations on the Opinion of the ECJ’s Advo-
cate General was denied. This denial, he argued before the ECtHR, constituted 
a violation of his right to a fair trial guaranteed by Article 6 ECHR. The ECtHR 
distinguished the case from Bosphorus arguing that the respondent Member 
States had not intervened any time, thus the violation did not occur within their 
jurisdiction and they could not be held responsible. 
10. Bosphorus, cited supra note 9, paras. 155 and 156.
11. Ibid., para 156.
12. Connolly v. 15 Member States of the European Union, Appl. no. 73274/01, 9 Dec. 2008; 
confirmed in: Beygo v. 46 Member States of the Council of Europe Appl. no. 36099/06, 16 June 
2009; Rambus Inc. v. Germany, Appl. no. 40382/04, 16 June 2009.
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 Accession by the EU to the ECHR would close this gap in the human rights 
protection. It would be possible for an applicant such as Connolly to hold the 
EU directly responsible in such cases. Furthermore, accession would ensure 
that the case law of the two European Courts would keep on evolving in step.13 
Where the Court of Justice deviates from the case law of the Court of Human 
Rights, an applicant would have the opportunity to challenge this before the 
ECtHR. 
3. The autonomy of the EU legal order
An accession treaty to the ECHR has to be compatible with the EU’s founding 
Treaties and will probably be the subject of an Opinion by the ECJ requested 
under Article 218(11) TFEU. The most prominent obstacle for international 
agreements is the autonomy of the European Union’s legal order, which some 
past draft agreements have failed to overcome. This was again highlighted by 
the ECJ in the recent Opinion 1/09 where it held that the EU may submit itself 
to the decisions of an international court, but that an agreement must nonethe-
less not violate the Treaties.14 The ECJ has had a chance to flesh out what the 
autonomy of EU law means in a number of Opinions and contentious cases. 
Since accession will subject the EU’s legal order to an external scrutiny by the 
ECtHR, the autonomy of EU law is likely to take centre stage in the accession 
negotiations and before the Court of Justice. The following short evaluation 
of the most important decisions on autonomy provides the background for the 
remainder of this contribution. 
 The ECJ’s case law reveals that a distinction needs to be drawn between 
two dimensions of autonomy: an internal dimension, of relevance to the rela-
tionship between the EU’s legal order and the domestic legal orders of the 
Member States, and an external dimension dealing with the relationship 
between the EU legal order and international law. The former relationship was 
addressed very early on in the Court’s case law when it held in the landmark 
decision of Costa v. ENEL that the (then) EEC Treaty constituted “le droit né 
du traité issu d’une source autonome” which was later translated into English 
as “the law stemming from the treaty, an independent source of law”.15 In that 
13. In the words of former A.G. Jacobs: “The ECJ … has followed scrupulously the case law 
of the European Court of Human Rights”, Jacobs, The Sovereignty of Law (CUP, 2007), 
pp. 54–55; on past and current developments cf. Callewaert, “The European Convention on 
Human Rights and European Union law: A long way to harmony”, (2009) European Human 
Rights Law Review, 768.
14. Opinion 1/09, 8 March 2011, nyr, paras. 74 et seq.
15. Case 6/64, Costa v. ENEL, [1964] ECR 585.
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case the autonomy of the EU’s legal order was employed as an argument for 
the primacy of EU law over domestic law. Moreover it meant that its binding 
force and primacy are not dependent on the domestic law of the Member States, 
but flow from the Treaties themselves.16 It is  remarkable that the ECJ did not 
elaborate on the concept of autonomy by providing a definition but seemed to 
take it as given. With regard to an accession of the EU to the ECHR, the exter-
nal dimension of autonomy is of greater relevance. Its first mention can be 
found in Opinion 1/91 on the first draft agreement on the European Economic 
Area (EEA). In that Opinion the ECJ declared the first EEA draft agreement 
to be incompatible with the autonomy of the EU’s legal order. The ECJ iden-
tified three distinct reasons why the agreement violated the autonomy of EU 
law. 
 First, the ECJ criticized the jurisdiction of the EEA Court envisaged by the 
agreement. That court was to have jurisdiction over disputes between the par-
ties to the EEA treaty. The term “party to the treaty”, however, had not been 
clearly defined since the EEA agreement was to be concluded as a mixed 
agreement, i.e. by both the EU and its Member States as parties. Thus in each 
of the proceedings before it, the EEA Court would have had to determine who 
was the correct “party to the agreement”. There were three possibilities: the 
EU, a Member State or the EU and the Member States together. This assess-
ment would have been based on the division of responsibility between the EU 
and its Member States under EU law: the EEA Court would therefore have had 
to interpret the EU’s treaties. This would have been “likely adversely to affect 
the distribution of responsibilities defined in the Treaties, and hence the auton-
omy of EU law” and consequently the exclusive jurisdiction of the ECJ.17
 The second reason was very much related to the first. The EEA Court would 
have been given jurisdiction to interpret the substantive rules of the EEA 
agreement. Many of the provisions in the EEA agreement had the same word-
ing as similar rules in the EEC Treaty and had been drafted according to them. 
From the point of view of the autonomy of EU law, this alone would not have 
been problematic.18 The ECJ acknowledged that these rules would not neces-
sarily have to be interpreted in the same way, since the aim and object of the 
EEA agreement was different from that of the EU Treaties. While the former 
was concerned with free trade and competition in economic relations between 
the parties, the latter’s objectives went further by creating a legal order of its 
16. Pernice, “Costa v ENEL and Simmenthal: Primacy of European Law”, in Maduro and 
Azoulai (Eds.), The Past and Future of EU Law (OUP, 2010), p. 48; on the development of the 
Court’s case law regarding the internal dimension of autonomy: Barents, The Autonomy of Com-
munity Law (Kluwer, 2004), pp. 239 et seq.
17. Opinion 1/91, [1991] ECR I-6079, para 35.
18. Ibid., para 40.
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own.19 However, it was the intention of the drafters that the provisions should 
be interpreted uniformly. Thus, the ECJ concluded, any interpretation of these 
identically worded provisions in the EEA Treaty would necessarily prejudice 
the interpretation of the provisions of the EU Treaties. The ECJ did not consider 
it sufficient that the EEA Court was obliged to follow the ECJ’s case law on 
these provisions since the agreement only provided for the EEA Court to fol-
low the case law existent on the day of signature of the EEA agreement. Any 
new developments in the ECJ’s case law would not have been included.20
 Third, the agreement foresaw a possibility for the domestic courts of the 
EFTA States to make a request for a preliminary reference to the ECJ regard-
ing the interpretation of the EEA agreement. The ECJ held that an agreement 
concluded by the EU could transfer new functions to the EU’s institutions. 
However, the autonomy of EU law meant that such a transfer could not lead 
to a de facto amendment of the Treaties. The problem in the case of the first 
EEA agreement was that the ECJ’s answers to the requests by the EFTA States’ 
domestic courts would not have been binding on them. This, the ECJ held, 
would have changed the nature of the preliminary reference procedure since 
under EU law any answer given by the ECJ binds the domestic court making 
the reference. Such a change in the nature of the functions of an EU institution 
could only be brought about by way of Treaty amendment according to Article 
48 TEU.
  Later, in Opinion 1/00, the ECJ took the opportunity to restate in its own 
words what the autonomy of EU law meant.21 It identified the following two 
aspects of the external dimension of autonomy: 
“Preservation of the autonomy of the Community legal order requires 
therefore, first, that the essential character of the powers of the Community 
and its institutions as conceived in the Treaty remain unaltered ... Second, 
it requires that the procedures for ensuring uniform interpretation of the 
rules of the European Common Aviation Area (ECAA) Agreement and for 
resolving disputes will not have the effect of binding the Community and 
its institutions, in the exercise of their internal powers, to a particular inter-
pretation of the rules of Community law referred to in that agreement.”22
 Thus, an international court must not interpret the Treaties in an internally 
binding fashion. In light of the Opinions rendered, the threshold for this seems 
to be rather low: it suffices if there is a danger that an international court 
19. Ibid., paras. 14–16.
20. Ibid., paras. 41–46; in the eyes of the Court, the problem was even aggravated by the 
agreement providing for ECJ judges to sit on the EEA Court.
21. Opinion 1/00 [2002] I-3493.
22. Ibid., paras. 12 and 13; this was re-affirmed in the Mox Plant decision, Case C-459/03, 
Commission v. Ireland, [2006] ECR I-4635, paras. 123 and 124.
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prejudices the interpretation of the Treaties. Furthermore, the EU and its Mem-
ber States must not circumvent the amendment procedure laid down in Arti-
cle 48 TEU by way of an international agreement with third parties. In Kadi, 
the Court confirmed this to mean that an international agreement equally could 
not prejudice the constitutional principles of the Treaties, especially funda-
mental rights.23 This conclusion added an additional twist to the ECJ’s juris-
prudence on the external dimension of the EU legal order’s autonomy: an 
agreement must neither constitute a hidden amendment to the Treaties nor may 
it touch upon other constitutional principles in primary EU law, including 
fundamental rights, which at the time the Kadi decision was handed down were 
only protected as unwritten general principles of EU law. 
 The concept’s relevance has again become apparent in the Court’s recent 
Opinion 1/0924 on the Draft Agreement on the European and Community Pat-
ents Court, which the ECJ declared to be incompatible with the Treaties. The 
ECJ distinguished the agreement before it from the agreements dealt with in 
the Opinions discussed above. The Patents Court would not only have been 
given jurisdiction to interpret the provisions of an international agreement but 
also to interpret EU law,25 which the Court had on previous occasions consid-
ered incompatible with the autonomy of EU law. The Court did not regard the 
built-in guarantees for the involvement of the ECJ to be sufficient even though 
they were closely modelled on the preliminary reference procedure contained 
in Article 267 TFEU. It based its arguments mainly on the effect this would 
have on the courts of the Member States, since under the Patent Agreement 
they would have been divested of their jurisdiction to decide disputes on EU 
patents.26 The agreement envisaged that their jurisdiction should be replaced 
by an exclusive jurisdiction of the Patents Court on actions relating to patents27 
leaving the national courts only with residual jurisdiction in these matters. 
This, the ECJ argued, would also strip them of their powers in relation to the 
interpretation and application of EU law.28 While the Patents Court was given 
the right, and in its guise as appeal court the duty, to make a preliminary refer-
ence to the ECJ, the ECJ concluded that there were not sufficient guarantees 
for its own involvement.29 The ECJ identified the problem that there was no 
possibility to enforce the duty to ask the ECJ for a reference. In contrast, where 
a national court violates its duty to make a reference to the ECJ, there are two 
possibilities to remedy this: either the Commission or another Member State 
23. Case C-402/05 P, Kadi v. Council and Commission, [2008] ECR I-6351, para 285.
24. Opinion 1/09, cited supra note 14.
25. Ibid., para 77.
26. Ibid., para 64.
27. Art. 15 of the draft agreement.
28. Opinion 1/09, cited supra note 14, para 89.
29. Ibid.
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can instigate infringement proceedings under Articles 258 and 259 TFEU.30 
Alternatively, an individual can bring a State liability case against the Member 
State.31 Since the Patents Court would have been given jurisdiction to interpret 
European Union legislation and primary law, the Court regarded this depriva-
tion of the national courts as a threat to the autonomy of EU law as it would 
consequently divest the ECJ of its jurisdiction, too. This Opinion adds a new 
dimension to the ECJ’s case law on the autonomy of the EU legal order. Not 
only does the Court consider that the EU’s own institutions must be protected 
from being affected by EU agreements, but also institutions of the Member 
States which carry out obligations under EU law. The autonomy of the EU’s 
legal order therefore permeates the national legal orders and partly incorporates 
them.
 The preceding analysis shows the importance of the autonomy principle in 
the ECJ’s case law on the compatibility of international agreements and of 
obligations arising from such agreements with EU law. The ECJ clearly views 
the autonomy of EU law as a principle of constitutional quality. Similar to its 
internal dimension, the external autonomy of the EU legal order means that it 
is not dependent on the rules of another legal order, in this case international 
law.32 EU law is therefore self-referential.33 It ensures that the Treaties cannot 
be amended through the back door, without sticking to the amendment proce-
dure laid down in Article 48 TEU. Treaty amendments are only possible inso-
far as EU law provides for them. Furthermore, it guarantees that the content 
of the EU’s internal rules are not determined by the interpretations of an outside 
body, but only by the EU’s own institutions – most notably the Court of Justice. 
 In this respect it is remarkable that the EU, which was founded as an inter-
national organization, should place so much emphasis on its own autonomy 
vis-à-vis international law. This is even more striking given that the ECJ does 
not allow for any such autonomy on the part of the Member States’ legal orders, 
but requires them to accept the supremacy of EU law.34 The ECJ’s case law on 
autonomy can therefore be read as proof of the EU’s emancipation from being 
a mere international organization to its current guise as a supranational entity 
which in many respects resembles a federal State. But even if one accepts that 
the autonomy of the EU’s legal order is ingrained in the EU’s constitution, that 
constitution, viz. the Treaties, may provide for limits. Article 6(2) TEU might 
be regarded as such a limit since it explicitly requires the EU’s accession to 
the ECHR. It could be argued that this explicit competence to accede limits 
30. Ibid., para 87.
31. Ibid., para 86.
32. Barents, op. cit. supra note 16, pp. 172 and 259.
33. Ibid., p. 259.
34. Starting with Case 26/62, Van Gend & Loos, [1963] ECR 1.
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the autonomy of EU law as far as an accession to the ECHR is concerned. This 
would presuppose, however, that Article 6(2) TEU has some substantive con-
tent and is not merely an attribution of an external competence. There is room 
for such an argument since Article 6(2) TEU additionally places the EU under 
a duty to accede. But the Treaties are silent as to the exact scope of that duty. 
In particular, there is nothing in the Treaties to suggest that Article 6(2) TEU 
demands that any and every form of ECHR accession agreement would have 
to be accepted regardless of its content. On the other hand, it is clear from that 
provision that the EU and its Member States must not reject the accession to 
the ECHR outright. Article 6(2) TEU therefore implies that a minimal acces-
sion restricted to the Convention as it stands would not in principle be in 
conflict with the autonomy of the EU’s legal order. This includes a possibility 
for review by the ECtHR. However, the exact ramifications for such review 
as they are laid down in the accession agreement may well not be in accordance 
with the requirements of the autonomy principle. 
 For this reason, it is justified to measure the draft agreement by the standards 
formulated in the ECJ’s case law on the autonomy principle. It is axiomatic 
that agreements which provide for the jurisdiction of a court outside the EU 
legal system are likely to come into conflict with the autonomy of EU law. 
Since the draft accession agreement is largely concerned with the procedure 
before the ECtHR, the autonomy of EU law will be an issue. This has been 
foreseen by the Lisbon Treaty, which in Protocol 8 states that the accession 
treaty “shall make provision for preserving the specific characteristics of the 
Union and Union law”, which is a reference to the preservation of the autonomy 
of EU law. The present article will therefore assess whether the provisions of 
the draft accession treaty would pass the hurdle of compatibility with the 
autonomy of EU law or whether further safeguards would be required. In doing 
so, it will also provide some general comments on the expedience of the pro-
posal.
4. Autonomy and the accession agreement
Accession of the EU to the ECHR is a rather unusual step in the EU’s treaty 
practice. One major difference between the agreements subject to the Opinions 
discussed above and the accession treaty is that the accession treaty does not 
envisage a transfer of the acquis communautaire to third States. On the con-
trary, the situation is such that the EU is to join an established treaty regime, 
which will lead to a degree of adaptation on the part of the EU. The EU will 
thus not be the sole dominant party at the negotiating table and might therefore 
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find it harder to push through all of its wishes.35 All this makes it a truly 
Herculean task for the negotiators. They have to devise a draft agreement which 
satisfies political demands, improves (or at the very least does not hinder) the 
protection of human rights and stays within the strict limits set by the autonomy 
of the EU legal order.
 Since a final accession treaty is not yet available, the following analysis is 
based on the drafts released so far36 and on other official documents available 
at the time of writing. These are documents produced by the informal working 
group, statements made by experts at a hearing before the European Parliament 
and documents produced by other national or EU institutions. I shall address 
four points. First, findings of violations by the Court of Human Rights. Second, 
the possible exclusion of primary law from the scrutiny of the ECtHR. Third, 
the co-respondent mechanism to be introduced by the accession treaty. Fourth, 
the plan to introduce a procedure to guarantee a prior involvement of the ECJ.
4.1. External control by the Court of Human Rights
After accession, individual applicants will have the opportunity to address 
applications regarding violations of the ECHR directly against the European 
Union. Such violations can potentially be found in primary law, in secondary 
law, in executive actions or omissions and in decisions of the Union’s courts. 
The question of concern for this contribution is whether such applications 
would be compatible with the autonomy of EU law. Two problems arise. The 
first is whether the ECtHR would have to interpret EU law in a binding man-
ner. The second is whether a pronouncement by the ECtHR that EU legislation 
was in violation of the Convention would be compatible with the autonomy 
of EU law. 
 When deciding upon an alleged violation of the Convention, the Court of 
Human Rights must take relevant domestic law into account. Thus at first 
glance, there is a danger of the ECtHR interpreting EU law. However, this is 
not the case. Just like other international courts, the ECtHR regards the domes-
tic law of the parties to the Convention as part of the facts. This is reflected in 
Huvig where the ECtHR stated that “it is primarily for the national authorities, 
notably the courts, to interpret and apply domestic law …. It is therefore not 
for the Court to express an opinion contrary to theirs ….”37 Thus the ECtHR 
35. Brandtner likened the situation of the EFTA States in the negotiations of the EEA agree-
ments to that of a “powerless audience” being frustrated by an important actor, Brandtner, “The 
‘Drama’ of the EEA”, 3 EJIL (1992), 328.
36. CDDH-UE(2011)04; CDDH-UE(2011)06; and CDDH-UE(2011)10, all cited supra 
note 1.
37. Huvig v. France, appl. no. 11105/84, Series A no. 176-B, para 28.
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would not undertake a binding interpretation of the content of EU law. How-
ever, De Schutter rightly pointed out that there seem to be instances where the 
ECtHR cannot merely accept the domestic law of the respondent party before 
it as facts.38 These are situations where the ECtHR’s determination of a viola-
tion necessarily forces it to assess provisions of domestic law. For instance, 
the question whether a remedy is effective according to Article 13 ECHR 
necessitates an assessment of certain domestic legal provisions. The same goes 
for judgments on whether a restriction of a human right was “prescribed by 
law”39 or whether someone was deprived of their liberty “in accordance with 
a procedure prescribed by law”.40 A recent example of a case where a similar 
assessment had to be made about EU law is the Kokkelvisserij case.41 As in 
Connolly, the applicant (a cooperative) complained that it had not been given 
the chance to respond to the submissions of the Advocate General, and thus 
its right to a fair trial guaranteed by Article 6 ECHR had been infringed. In 
contrast to Connolly, the ECtHR addressed the substantive question. It accepted 
the ECJ’s argument in the EU proceedings at issue, where it had pointed to 
Article 61 of its Rules of Procedure which allows for the reopening of the oral 
procedure after the Opinion of the Advocate General has been rendered.42 In 
view of that provision and of an Opinion by Advocate General Sharpston in 
another case where she had explicitly referred to the possibility of reopening 
the proceedings according to that Article,43 the Court came to the conclusion 
that this was a realistic option. The example shows that the ECtHR occasion-
ally has to look closely at provisions of domestic law. The autonomy of EU 
law would however only be affected if this led to an internally binding deter-
mination of their content, which would not be the case. The ECtHR only 
decides whether there was a violation of the Convention in a concrete scenario 
after proceedings at the domestic level have been completed. The ECtHR then 
takes into consideration the relevant national law and the practice of the domes-
tic courts in interpreting and applying this law. The ECtHR’s take on this 
question is reflected in Kemmache:
38. De Schutter, “L’adhésion de l’Union européenne à la Convention européenne des droits 
de l’homme: Feuille de route de la négotiation”, 83 Revue Trimestrielle des droits de l’homme 
(2010), 551–552.
39. Cf. Art. 8(2), 9(2), 10(2), 11(2) ECHR.
40. Art. 5 ECHR.
41. Kokkelvisserij v. Netherlands, Appl. no. 13645/05, 20 Jan. 2009.
42. Case C-127/02, Waddenvereniging and Vogelbeschermingsvereniging, [2004] ECR 
I-7405; the ECJ’s order has not been published, but an excerpt appears in the ECtHR’s decision.
43. Opinion of A.G. Sharpston in Case C-212/06, Gouvernement de la Communauté fran-
çaise and Gouvernement Wallon, [2008] ECR I-1683, para 157.
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“The Court reiterates that the words ‘ in accordance with a procedure pre-
scribed by law’ essentially refer back to domestic law; they state the need 
for compliance with the relevant procedure under that law. However, the 
domestic law must itself be in conformity with the Convention, including 
the general principles expressed or implied therein. …”44
Although it is not normally the Strasbourg Court’s task to review the obser-
vance of domestic law by the national authorities, it is otherwise in relation to 
matters where, as here, the Convention refers directly back to that law; for, in 
such matters, disregard of the domestic law entails breach of the Convention, 
with the consequence that the ECtHR can and should exercise a certain power 
of review. However, the logic of the system of safeguard established by the 
Convention sets limits on the scope of this review. It is in the first place for 
the national authorities, notably the courts, to interpret and apply the domestic 
law, even in those fields where the Convention “incorporates” the rules of that 
law: the national authorities are, in the nature of things, particularly qualified 
to settle the issues arising in this context.
In a case like this, the ECtHR would therefore not be the first court to decide 
on the interpretation of domestic law. Its decision cannot prejudice that inter-
pretation since the decision of the ECtHR is limited to two possible outcomes. 
Either it accepts the interpretative practice of a domestic provision by a domes-
tic court as compliant with the Convention, in which case the Court would not 
need to interpret the domestic law itself but merely apply it as a fact. The 
interpretation of the provision would thus not be affected. Alternatively, the 
Court does not accept the domestic practice as sufficient. It could for instance 
come to the conclusion that a measure was not prescribed by domestic law or 
that there was no effective domestic remedy. The respondent party would then 
have to introduce new legislation in order to remove the violation. But it would 
not perform an original interpretation of domestic law. In neither scenario 
would the ECtHR therefore determine the interpretation of existing domestic 
law in an internally binding manner. Thus the possibility of an external review 
does not endanger the autonomy of EU law. 
 The other issue regarding the autonomy of EU law would be situations where 
the ECtHR finds a piece of secondary law to have violated the Convention. 
Would such a finding be compatible with the autonomy of EU law? After all, 
the ECJ has a monopoly on declaring European Union law invalid45 and any 
such declaration by an international court would be incompatible with the 
autonomy of EU law. However, this is not what the Court of Human Rights 
44. Kemmache v. France, Appl. no. 17621/91, Series A no. 296-C.
45. Case 314/85, Firma Foto-Frost v. Hauptzollamt Lübeck-Ost, [1987] ECR 4199, para 15.
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would do.46 Its decisions have no automatic direct effect in the legal orders of 
the parties to the Convention. This is evident from the wording of the Conven-
tion, which states in Article 46 that the “High Contracting parties undertake 
to abide by the final judgment of the Court in any case to which they are par-
ties”. The judgments of the ECtHR are of a declaratory nature and only bind-
ing under international law. Their effect in domestic legal orders depends on 
the individual parties. Yet as regards the EU’s legal order, the ECJ’s own case 
law suggests that the decisions of the ECtHR might become directly appli-
cable. The Court held in Opinion 1/91:
“Where, however, an international agreement provides for its own system 
of courts, including a court with jurisdiction to settle disputes between the 
Contracting Parties to the agreement, and, as a result to interpret its provi-
sions, the decisions of that court will be binding on the Community institu-
tions, including the Court of Justice.”47 
This does not mean, however, that the piece of EU legislation considered to 
be incompatible with the Convention would be invalid as soon as the ECtHR 
has spoken. Rather this excerpt from Opinion 1/91 suggests that the applicant 
would still need to seek a declaration of invalidity by the ECJ, which would 
be bound in its findings by the judgment of the Court of Human Rights. 
Alternatively, the other institutions of the EU could of course amend or revoke 
the provisions found to be in violation of the ECHR. Under international law, 
they would even be bound to do so in order to comply with their obligations 
under Article 46 ECHR. But this cannot lead to an incompatibility with the 
autonomy of EU law, since the reason for the receptiveness towards the deci-
sions of the ECtHR lies in the EU’s own constitution as interpreted by the ECJ 
and would not be imposed upon it by the accession treaty. There is a further 
argument why a finding that an external control of EU actions and omissions 
by the Strasbourg Court would still be compatible with the autonomy of the 
EU legal order. As already mentioned, Article 6(2) TEU explicitly provides 
for the EU’s accession to the ECHR. When drafting this provision, the Member 
States clearly anticipated that by signing up to the ECHR, the EU would sub-
ject itself to the jurisdiction of the ECtHR. Since the autonomy of the EU’s 
legal order stems from the Treaties, explicit provisions in the Treaties cannot 
be in contradiction to it. 
46. W v. Netherlands, Appl. no. 20689/08, 20 Jan. 2009. The Court stated: “[I]t is not for the 
Court to rule on the validity of national laws in the hierarchy of domestic legislation”.
47. Opinion 1/91, cited supra note 17, para 39.
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4.2. Exclusion of primary law
In the discussions around the accession, a proposal was made that primary EU 
law, i.e. mainly the Treaties, should be excluded from the ECtHR’s review.48 
The reason behind this proposal appears to be that the EU cannot itself amend 
its own primary law. Therefore, it should not be responsible for it.49 This pro-
posal does not appear to have been included in the draft agreement. The revised 
draft agreement allows only for reservations to be made “in respect of any 
particular provision of the Convention to the extent that any law of the European 
Union then in force is not in conformity with the Convention”.50 This provision 
would make it possible to make a reservation as regards primary law. However, 
another provision in the agreement dealing with the so-called co-respondent 
mechanism, which is discussed in greater detail below, suggests that such 
exclusion is not intended. That provision states that a Member State can be 
designated as a co-respondent “if it appears that [an] allegation calls into ques-
tion the compatibility with the Convention rights at issue of a provision of the 
Treaty on European Union, the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union or any other provision having the same legal value …”.51 From this it 
is clear that an exclusion of primary law is not intended. 
 Moreover, it is submitted here that such exclusion would in fact endanger 
the autonomy of the EU’s legal order. If a case were brought to the ECtHR, 
that Court would be forced to make an assessment as to whether the violation 
occurred in the EU’s primary law (as it did in Matthews) or whether it could 
be found in secondary law or executive or judicial action. This assessment 
would have to be made on the basis of the Treaties, requiring the ECtHR to 
pinpoint who is responsible for the violation. Thus it would have to interpret 
the Treaties in a binding fashion, which would constitute a violation of the 
autonomy of the EU legal order. In conclusion, it would not be possible to 
exclude parts of EU law from a review by the ECtHR.
4.3. The co-respondent mechanism
After an accession by the EU to the ECHR, it will become crucial for an indi-
vidual applicant to know who they should hold responsible in the Strasbourg 
48. This seemed to be the opinion of the French Government, cf. French Senate, “Communi-
cation de M. Robert Badinter sur le mandat de négociation (E 5248)”, 25 May 2010, available 
at: <www.senat.fr/europe/r25052010.html#toc1> (last visited 24 May 2011).
49. Köngeter, “Völkerrechtliche und innerstaatliche Probleme eines Beitritts der Europä-
ischen Union zur EMRK”, in Bast (Ed.), Die Europäische Verfassung, Verfassungen in Europa 
(2005), pp. 230, 245.
50. Art. 3 of CDDH-UE(2011)10, cited supra note 1.
51. Art. 4(3) of CDDH-UE(2011)10, cited supra note 1.
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Court for violations of the Convention originating in EU law. The reason is 
that it is usually the Member States who implement European Union law, so 
that from the point of view of an individual applicant it is the Member State 
which acted. Thus such an applicant might be tempted to hold the Member 
State responsible even where that Member State had no discretion when it 
came to the implementation of EU law. The Bosphorus case provides an exam-
ple. Ireland had no discretion in implementing the EU Regulation which 
demanded that Yugoslav aircraft should be impounded. Yet Ireland could be 
held responsible since her authorities had acted. Had the EU already been a 
party to the ECHR, Bosphorus might have chosen to hold the EU responsible 
since the alleged violation of its right to property was situated in the Regulation 
itself. However, since an applicant in a comparable situation might not be 
aware of the intricacies surrounding the implementation of EU law, she might 
equally hold the Member States responsible since she had only ever been in 
contact with that Member State’s authorities and not with the EU.
 Due to this difficulty in locating where exactly the alleged violation of the 
Convention happened, the negotiators of the EU’s accession suggest introduc-
ing a co-respondent mechanism.52 This mechanism would allow the EU and a 
Member State to be joined as co-respondents so that both could be held respon-
sible for an alleged violation.53 The co-respondent mechanism would be dif-
ferent from the already existing possibility of naming multiple respondents 
from the outset. The working group on accession identified the difference as 
lying in the fact that the EU and the Member States are not entirely autonomous 
from each other54 and found that this would avoid gaps in accountability under 
the Convention system.55 Furthermore, as will be explained below, the co-
respondent mechanism only requires that the domestic remedies of either the 
EU or the Member State are exhausted. The exact conditions for the application 
of the mechanism are not yet clear. The three available draft provisions dealing 
with the mechanism all differ quite significantly. As this contribution is primar-
ily concerned with the autonomy of the EU legal order, both the first and 
second revised drafts are commented on. Given that the informal working 
group on accession has not yet come to a final agreement on the wording of 
52. This mechanism was first introduced by the Council of Europe’s Steering committee for 
human rights in its 2002 study on the technical and legal issues of a possible EC/EU accession 
to the European Convention on Human Rights, CDDH(2002)010 Addendum 2. See also Jacqué, 
supra note 2.
53. It is still undecided whether the mechanism should be extended to non-EU Member 
States in cases where they apply EU law through separate agreements, cf. CDDH-UE(2011)06, 
cited supra note 1, para 7.
54. CDDH-UE(2010)14, Informal working group on the accession of the EU to the ECHR, 
Meeting report of the 3rd working meeting, 22 Oct. 2010, para 9.
55. CDDH-UE(2011), para 37.
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the co-respondent provision, it is worthwhile exploring the compatibility of 
both drafts with the autonomy principle. 
 The first revised draft agreement provided the following:
“Where an application is notified to the European Union or to a member 
state of the European Union, or to both of them, and it appears that an act 
or omission underlying an alleged violation notified could only have been 
avoided by disregarding an obligation under European Union law, [a High 
Contracting Party] / [either of the High Contracting Parties] may become 
a co-respondent to the proceedings by decision of the Court.”56 
It is clear from this draft that the mechanism would be triggered in two situa-
tions. The first would be where the EU and one or more Member States are 
held responsible for the same violation from the outset. The second situation 
would occur where either the EU or a Member State is nominated as the origi-
nal respondent and a potential co-respondent joins at a later stage.57 Where the 
EU and a Member State are held responsible by the same applicant for differ-
ent violations, the mechanism is not applicable.58 Procedurally, the status of 
co-respondent would be conferred on a party by decision of the ECtHR. 
 At first glance the proposal to introduce a co-respondent mechanism raises 
no serious objections with a view to the autonomy of the EU’s legal order. It 
is particularly noteworthy that the ECtHR’s decision to join the EU and a 
Member State as co-respondents would not necessitate a determination of the 
competences between the EU and the Member States, which would be one 
possibility of deciding who is responsible under the Convention.59 In that sense, 
the co-respondent mechanism is to be understood as a way of avoiding a situ-
ation in which a respondent, say a Member State, would claim not be respon-
sible for the violation maintaining that the violation was the responsibility of 
the EU, and vice versa. This makes the co-respondent mechanism a viable tool 
for avoiding interferences with the autonomy of the EU legal order. However, 
this would only be the case if it were made clear that the defendants in such 
proceedings would not have a right to raise the defence just mentioned. Such 
a defence would for instance be conceivable in a scenario like Bosphorus. If 
the EU refused to join the respondent Member State as co-respondent, that 
Member State should not be able to argue that responsibility in reality lies with 
56. Art. 4 of CDDH-UE(2011)06.
57. CDDH-UE(2010)16, Informal working group on the accession of the EU to the ECHR, 
Draft revised elements prepared by the Secretariat on the introduction of a co-respondent mech-
anism.
58. Draft revised explanatory report, CDDH-UE(2011)08, para 34.
59. Cf. Lock, “EU accession to the ECHR: Implications for judicial review in Strasbourg”, 
(2010) EL Rev., 777.
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the EU. This implies that the Member States’ responsibility for EU law as 
expounded in Matthews would in principle have to continue. Otherwise the 
ECtHR would be forced to decide who was actually responsible for a violation 
of the Convention under EU law. Such an assessment would involve an inter-
pretation of the Treaties in an internally binding manner and would thus violate 
the autonomy of the EU’s legal order.60 Arguably, in some cases such a situa-
tion could be avoided if one adopted a “soft approach” to violations of the 
autonomy principle.61 Again the Bosphorus scenario might provide an example 
as the legal situation was relatively clear and easy to understand. Ireland’s 
decision to impound the aircraft was based on one legal basis, which was a 
directly applicable EU Regulation. Thus there would have been no problem 
for the ECtHR to identify the location of the alleged violation without having 
to engage in difficult interpretations of EU law. However, one can conceive of 
cases where a similar assessment would be very difficult to make, for instance, 
the case of an EU Directive, which had been transposed into national law. A 
Member State might raise the defence that the alleged violation occurred 
because it did not have any discretion in transposing the relevant part of the 
Directive. If the ECtHR had to make an assessment of such a situation, it would 
be forced to interpret the Directive as to how much discretion was left to the 
Member State in the concrete case, which would be incompatible with the 
autonomy of the EU legal order. In order to avoid this, the draft should make 
it clear that such a defence is inadmissible. 
 As regards the requirements for its applicability, the first revised draft states 
that the co-respondent mechanism is triggered in cases of a normative conflict, 
limiting its applicability to situations where a conflict could only have been 
avoided by disregarding an obligation under EU law.62 This would only be the 
case where the Member State has no discretion in implementing its obligations 
or where, if there is discretion, all options would lead to a conflict with EU 
obligations. In this regard the draft is reminiscent of the requirements for 
applying the Bosphorus presumption. The very first draft contained the require-
ment of a substantive link with EU law,63 compared with which the requirement 
of a normative conflict is clearer and more certain. However, that requirement 
also forces the ECtHR to make an assessment whether it appears that the 
60. Cf. Opinion 1/91, cited supra note 17, para 34.
61. These might be the cases for which the explanatory report on the first draft agreement 
provides that “the ECtHR is free to develop its own practice as regards the allocation of respon-
sibility between respondents” but at the same time predicts that the ECtHR would not do so 
where there would be a risk of assessing the distribution of competences between the EU and its 
Member States, CDDH-UE(2011)05, para 56.
62. Art. 4(1), CDDH-UE(2011)06, cited supra note 1.
63. Art. 4(1), CDDH-UE(2011)04, cited supra note 1.
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respondent could only have avoided a violation of the Convention by violating 
an obligation under EU law. In order to make this assessment, the ECtHR has 
to define what the obligations of the respondent Member State are under EU 
law and whether EU law gave the Member State a degree of discretion which 
would have allowed it to avoid the conflict. This may force the ECtHR to make 
quite a detailed interpretation of EU primary and secondary law and is therefore 
potentially in conflict with the autonomy of the EU legal order. The informal 
working group appears to have been aware of this problem when composing 
the draft agreement. Article 4(5) of the draft revised agreement provides that 
“When deciding on such requests [to become co-respondent] the Court shall 
assess whether the reasons stated … are not manifestly incomplete or incon-
sistent”. It is envisaged that the ECtHR would only examine superficially 
whether the requirement of a normative conflict is fulfilled. This is clearly a 
strategy of avoiding a violation of the autonomy of EU law. Should that version 
of the draft become part of the final agreement, the ECJ might accept it as a 
way of avoiding a conflict with the autonomy principle. However, there can 
be no certainty as to that effect. 
 Even more problematic cases might arise in connection with alleged viola-
tions of the ECHR by omission. A decision of such a case might involve a 
determination of who was under an obligation to act in the concrete case: the 
Member State or the EU. Such assessment could only be made on the basis of 
the division of competence within the EU and would violate the autonomy of 
the EU’s legal order. If both EU and Member State are co-respondents this 
could be avoided if a defence of not being internally responsible were impos-
sible. In that sense the discussion is very similar to the discussion on active 
violations of the Convention. A proposed amendment to Article 59 ECHR 
contained in the revised draft agreement, however, causes concern. It states 
that “nothing in the Convention ... shall require the European Union to perform 
an act or adopt a measure for which it has no competence”.64 The explanatory 
report reveals that this provision reflects the requirement in Article 6(2) TEU, 
according to which the accession shall not affect the competences of the EU.65 
The danger is, however, that this provision would be invoked as a defence in 
proceedings before the ECtHR, which then would have to decide on the allo-
cation of competences based on the Treaties. This would not be in accordance 
with the autonomy of EU law and constitutes a weakness in the proposal by 
the informal working group which does not seem to have been addressed yet. 
It would be better if, in case of an omission, no such defence could be raised 
and the question were resolved internally by the EU and its institutions, most 
64. Art. 1(2) of CDDH-UE(2011)10, cited supra note 1.
65. CDDH-UE(2011)05, para 26.
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notably the ECJ. For this very reason, it is not necessary to include this provi-
sion in the agreement, since an internal resolution of a violation of the Conven-
tion would have to be in accordance with Article 6(2) TEU anyway.
 A related issue would be whether the ECtHR should designate the precise 
origin of a violation it has found in proceedings brought against co-respon-
dents. Such designation would raise the same objection just made: it would 
potentially involve an interpretation of EU law. The informal working group 
seems to be aware of this problem when stating that the “Court would not 
acquire any power to rule on the distribution of competences between the EU 
and its member states”.66 Nonetheless the working group considers that in some 
cases “there may be an interest in precisely indicating the origin of the 
violation”.67 Human rights organizations have also argued for such determina-
tion by the Court of Human Rights.68 They rightly contend that this would 
allow for an effective execution of judgments and swift redress for the appli-
cant. However, it is hard to see how such a demand could be squared with the 
need to preserve the autonomy of EU law. Instead of an allocation of respon-
sibility by the Court of Human Rights, it would make sense to create a mech-
anism at EU level for this purpose instead.
 The latest version of the co-respondent mechanism appears to have been 
drafted with similar concerns in mind. It reads:
“Where an application is directed against one or more member States of 
the European Union, the European Union may become a co-respondent to 
the proceedings in respect of an alleged violation notified by the Court if it 
appears that such allegation calls into question the compatibility with the 
Convention rights at issue of a provision of European Union law. 
Where an application is directed against the European Union, the Euro-
pean Union member States may become co-respondents to the proceed-
ings in respect of an alleged violation notified by the Court if it appears 
that such allegation calls into question the compatibility with the Conven-
tion rights at issue of a provision of the Treaty on European Union, the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union or any other provision 
having the same legal value pursuant to those instruments.”69
For cases in which the EU is co-respondent, this version no longer presupposes 
the existence of a normative conflict and is much closer to the original draft 
66. CDDH-UE(2010)17, Informal working group on the accession of the EU to the ECHR, 
Meeting report of the 4th working meeting, 8 Dec. 2010, para 14.
67. Ibid.
68. Views of the European group of national human rights institutions to the CDDH-UE 
working group, available at <www.coe.int/t/dghl/standardsetting/hrpolicy/CDDH-UE/CDDH-
UE_documents/EG%20_%20Submisssion.pdf> (last visited 24 May 2011).
69. Art. 4(2) and (3) of CDDH-UE(2011)10, cited supra note 1.
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agreement which required a “substantive link”. If this newer proposal were 
adopted, the role of the ECtHR would be reduced to assessing whether “it 
appears” that a provision of EU law is compatible with the Convention. Such 
appearance could be deemed to exist wherever one of the parties advances an 
argument to that effect. The ECtHR’s competence to interpret EU law under 
this new proposal would be even further reduced since Article 4(5) of the 
revised draft provides that the Court should only assess whether “it is plausible 
that the conditions … are met”.70 Thus the new draft appears to offer a viable 
solution accommodating both practical needs and the restraints imposed upon 
the negotiators by the autonomy principle.
 However, there is potentially a conflict with the autonomy of EU law as far 
as concerns the designation of the Member States as co-respondents for cases 
in which the EU is the original respondent. The first draft quoted above pro-
vides that in cases in which the EU was the original respondent one or more 
Member States may only be joined as co-respondents where the EU could not 
have possibly avoided the violation. The provision would only apply in situ-
ations where the violation is located in EU primary law, which cannot be 
amended by the EU itself. In this regard, the first revised draft is clearly based 
on the Matthews case law.71 The very latest draft has the same content but is 
worded more explicitly in that respect. The crucial difference between the two 
lies in the ECtHR’s competence to examine the conditions for the applicabil-
ity of the co-respondent mechanism. The first draft discussed here would 
require the ECtHR to interpret EU law and assess which rank in the hierarchy 
of norms the provision in question has, which is likely to be in conflict with 
the autonomy of EU law. In contrast, the latest version would only require the 
Court to assess whether “it appears” that the compatibility of primary EU law 
with the Convention was at issue. Again this assessment would be carried out 
in a rather superficial manner, not involving a binding interpretation of EU 
law. 
 Regarding the designation of the co-respondent, Article 4(5) of the revised 
draft and the explanatory report reveal that a party would become co-respon-
dent either on its own application with leave of the Court or upon invitation 
by the Court.72 Where the Court decides to invite a co-respondent to join, the 
potential co-respondent would be free to accept the invitation or not.73 Where 
both the EU and a Member State are held responsible from the outset, the Court 
has to decide whether to treat them as co-respondents or as merely joint respon-
dents. To this author, it is not quite clear why the co-respondent should not be 
70. Art. 4(5) of CDDH-UE(2011)10, cited supra note 1.
71. CDDH-UE(2011)08, cited supra note 58.
72. Ibid., para 40.
73. Ibid., para 41.
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compelled to join proceedings. It is undisputed that where both are nominated 
as co-respondents by the applicant, they have no choice but to partake in the 
proceedings. There is arguably no difference in the situation where they are 
later joined by decision of the Court. As will become evident later, not compel-
ling the co-respondent to join the proceedings leads to problems.
 It follows from the above discussion that in order to comply with the require-
ments of the autonomy of EU law, the current legal situation whereby a Mem-
ber State is generally held responsible for all actions and omissions associated 
with the implementation of its obligations under EU law would have to be 
retained. Neither the drafters nor the ECtHR should accept a defence raised 
by a Member State arguing that it had only acted in strict compliance with its 
obligations under EU law and was therefore not responsible. Furthermore, 
giving the ECtHR jurisdiction to define the obligations of the Member States 
under EU law as a preliminary requirement for the applicability of the co-
respondent mechanism would lead to a violation of the autonomy of EU law. 
The newest draft seems to be a good solution to circumvent these problems. 
This author would suggest that the best way of avoiding any problems with 
the autonomy of EU law would be to re-define the co-respondent mechanism. 
A co-respondent should only be joined to the proceedings at the request of the 
original respondent. In that case it would be the original respondent’s respon-
sibility to assess the situation. It would arguably be best placed to do so since 
in preparing a defence for its case it would have to consider whether the true 
responsibility for the violation lies with the EU or within its own jurisdiction. 
Should the designated co-respondent object to its involvement, it would have 
to do so under EU law but it should be impossible to raise an objection before 
the ECtHR. This solution would avoid an interpretation of EU law and an 
analysis of exact responsibilities of the Member States under the Treaties and 
would therefore help preserve the autonomy of EU law. 
4.4. Prior involvement of the ECJ
As has been demonstrated, despite the envisaged co-respondent mechanism, 
the Member States would remain responsible for violations originating in EU 
law. The main difference to the situation prior to accession would be that the 
EU could also be held responsible, be it as the sole respondent or as a co-
respondent alongside one or more Member States. Where the EU is held 
responsible as a sole respondent, the only domestic remedy available to an 
individual at EU level is the procedure found in Article 263(4) TFEU. Thus 
an applicant would have to go down that route in order to satisfy the require-
ment of Article 35(1) ECHR according to which she must exhaust all domestic 
remedies and file the application within six months of the final decision. 
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Where the applicant chooses to hold a Member State responsible, the rem-
edy to be exhausted is found in that Member State’s legal order. Since the 
Member States implement the bulk of European Union legislation, an applicant 
will normally choose to take legal action in that Member State. There are two 
main reasons for this. First, the applicant may not be aware that the Member 
State’s action was based on EU legislation and therefore may not be aware of 
the choice he has. Second, it may be tactically wiser to hold the Member State 
responsible since the national courts (and eventually the ECtHR) would also 
review whether the implementing actions of the Member State’s authorities 
were in accordance with the Convention. Thus the ECtHR would not be 
restricted to examine the EU legislative basis only, which would be the case 
if the application were directed against the EU. 
Where the Member State is designated as the respondent, the problem arises 
that the ECJ may not have made any decision as to the compatibility of the EU 
legislative act with fundamental rights and would thus not have been given the 
chance to remedy the violation. This is because the only way of involving the 
ECJ would have been through the preliminary reference procedure under 
Article 267 TFEU. Of course, Member State courts are under an obligation to 
make such a reference either if they are a court of last instance74 or where they 
are convinced that a piece of EU legislation is invalid.75 But there is no guar-
antee for the applicant that a reference is actually made and they cannot enforce 
the obligation. A domestic court may fail to refer a case either because it was 
not aware of the duty under Article 267 TFEU or because it came to the con-
clusion that one of the exceptions to the duty to make a reference imposed on 
courts of last resort applied. Such exceptions are found in the ECJ’s CILFIT 
decision. According to that decision a national court of last instance need not 
make a reference where the question raised is irrelevant to the outcome of the 
case, where the EU law provision has already been interpreted by the ECJ (acte 
éclairé) or where the correct application of EU law is so obvious as to leave 
no scope for any reasonable doubt (acte clair).76 
For such cases it has been suggested by a number of contributors to the 
recent discussion on accession that there would have to be a mechanism to 
involve the ECJ after proceedings before the ECtHR have been instigated. In 
a joint communication, the presidents of the ECJ and the ECtHR stated:
“In order that the principle of subsidiarity may be respected also in that 
situation, a procedure should be put in place, in connection with the acces-
sion of the EU to the Convention, which is flexible and would ensure that 
74. Art. 267(3) TFEU.
75. Firma Foto-Frost v. Hauptzollamt Lübeck-Ost, cited supra note 45, para 15.
76. Case 283/81, CILFIT, [1982] ECR 3415, para 21.
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the CJEU may carry out an internal review before the ECHR carries out 
external review.”77
Proposals on how to ensure a prior internal review include a preliminary refer-
ence by the ECtHR to the ECJ,78 an involvement of the ECJ by means of an 
opinion,79 a right of the Commission to instigate proceedings before the ECJ 
while proceedings before the ECtHR are temporarily suspended80 and even a 
preliminary reference from the ECJ to the ECtHR in lieu of the individual 
application.81 
Before addressing the proposal contained in the revised draft agreement, an 
initial question should be answered: is such involvement required in order to 
preserve the autonomy of EU law? That would be so if the ECtHR were given 
jurisdiction to interpret the Treaties in a binding fashion in the absence of a 
procedure ensuring the prior involvement of the ECJ. As explained above, this 
would not be the case. A finding by the ECtHR of a violation of the Convention 
would not directly lead to an invalidation of the EU act in question. Therefore, 
the involvement of the ECJ is not required in order to preserve the autonomy 
of EU law.82 
77. Joint communication from Presidents Costa and Skouris, available at: <www.echr.coe.
int/NR/rdonlyres/02164A4C-0B63-44C3-80C7-FC594EE16297/0/2011Communication_CED-
HCJUE_EN.pdf> (last visited 24 May 2011); a similar argument had previously been made by 
the ECJ: Discussion document of the Court of Justice of the European Union on certain aspects 
of the accession of the European Union to the European Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, available at: <curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/applica-
tion/pdf/2010-05/convention_en.pdf> (last visited 24 May 2011); the (classified) negotiation 
directives issued by the Council of the EU also contain a reference to it, which can be found in 
a working document from the EU Commission, doc. DS 1930/10. 
78. Badinter, “Adhésion de l’Union européenne à la convention européenne de sauvegarde 
des droits de l’Homme”, French Senate, available at: <www.senat.fr/europe/r25052010.
html#toc1> (last visited 24 May 2011).
79. Informal working group on accession, Draft additional elements prepared by the Secre-
tariat on procedural means guaranteeing the prior involvement of the Court of Justice of the EU 
in cases in which it has not been able to pronounce on compatibility of an EU act with funda-
mental rights, CDDH-UE(2011)02.
80. ECJ Judge Timmermans made that proposal at a hearing before the European Parlia-
ment’s Committee on Constitutional Affairs on 18 March 2010, available at: <www.europarl.
europa.eu/activities/committees/eventsCom.do?language=EN&body=AFCO> (last visited 24 
May 2011).
81. Steering committee for human rights, technical and legal issues of a possible EC/EU 
accession to the European Convention on Human Rights, CDDH(2002)010 Addendum 2 
paras. 75–77.
82. In fact, two members of the informal working group have “reserved their position” on the 
introduction of a prior involvement, CDDH-UE(2011)10, cited supra note 1; this author has 
voiced his principled criticism elsewhere, cf. Lock, op. cit. supra note 59.
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There is, however, a danger that the introduction of such a mechanism could 
itself be incompatible with the autonomy of the EU legal order as it might 
constitute a hidden amendment to the Treaties if it were included in the acces-
sion agreement. Should the drafters not include any reference to an internal 
mechanism, every agreement internal to the EU would have to be measured 
by the same standards. Opinion 1/91 showed that a Union agreement may 
provide the Union’s institutions with new functions. However, it must not 
change the nature of their function. This means that the ECJ must not be given 
a role which it currently does not have under the Treaties. If the mechanism 
foresaw a new procedure before the ECJ, which was not based on one of the 
currently existing procedures, the autonomy of the EU legal order could con-
sequently be violated. This would certainly be the case if a procedure were 
introduced which allowed for a preliminary reference from the ECJ to the 
ECtHR, since the ECJ does not normally make such references. Enabling the 
ECtHR to make a preliminary reference to the ECJ might also prove problem-
atic in light of Opinion 1/09. It is recalled that the ECJ regarded the enforce-
ability of the duty to make a reference as indispensable.83 This hurdle would 
be hard to overcome, since the ECtHR is a court operating outside the EU’s 
legal system and outside the reach of the infringement procedures under Arti-
cles 258 and 260 TFEU. However, since the prior involvement of the ECJ is 
not necessitated by the autonomy of EU law, the enforceability of a duty on 
the part of the ECtHR would not be of relevance. This is a crucial difference 
to the situation in Opinion 1/09. 
The informal working group on accession considered the question of a prior 
involvement of the ECJ and generally seemed to be in agreement that in cases 
where the EU is a co-respondent and where the Court of Justice has not yet 
had an opportunity to rule on the conformity with fundamental rights of the 
EU act in question, there should be such involvement.84 The latest available 
draft at the time of writing reads as follows: 
“In proceedings to which the European Union is co-respondent, if the 
Court of Justice of the European Union has not yet assessed the compati-
bility with the Convention rights at issue of the provision of European 
Union law as under paragraph 2, then sufficient time shall be afforded for 
the Court of Justice of the European Union to make such an assessment 
and subsequently for the parties to make observations. The European 
Union shall ensure that such assessment is made quickly so that the pro-
ceedings before the European Court of Human Rights are not unduly 
delayed.”85 
83. Opinion 1/09, cited supra note 14, para 89.
84. Meeting report, 5th working meeting of the informal working group, CDDH-UE(2011)03.
85. Art. 4(3) of CDDH-UE(2011)10, cited supra note 1.
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With regard to the autonomy of the EU legal order, the procedure before the 
Court of Justice might prove problematic. The draft does not reveal anything 
about how and by whom the review before the ECJ is to be initiated. The very 
first draft provided explicitly that it was to be conducted in accordance with 
internal rules of the EU.86 There is nothing to suggest that the revised draft is 
meant to change this. The reference to internal rules of the Union was intended 
to avoid a violation of the autonomy of EU law, which remains a valid objec-
tive. If the draft provided for a specific procedure, this would potentially 
involve a hidden Treaty amendment and fall foul of the requirements for pre-
serving the autonomy of EU law. Thus the determination of the procedure 
before the Court of Justice has been left to the European Union. This contribu-
tion assumes that the EU would want to avoid having to amend the Treaties. 
Not only would an amendment potentially trigger referenda in some Member 
States with an uncertain outcome but it would hardly be limited to the rather 
specific technical questions surrounding an accession of the EU to the ECHR 
and might thus open a Pandora’s Box by allowing the Member States to re-
negotiate the Treaties as a whole.
 The question for the EU is therefore which options, if any, the EU has on 
the basis of the current Treaties and within the constraints imposed by the 
autonomy of EU law. In a working document, the Commission argues that the 
procedure for the prior involvement of the ECJ should be similar to the pro-
cedure governing the preliminary reference procedure.87 It is envisaged that 
such a procedure would be included in the Council decision concluding the 
accession treaty.88 The question is whether the introduction of such a procedure 
would be in accordance with the autonomy of EU law. The Commission argues 
that this would be so pointing to Article 19 TEU, which states that the ECJ 
ensures “that in the interpretation and application of the Treaties the law is 
observed”.89 Yet Article 19 TEU does not provide for a specific procedure 
before the ECJ, but merely defines the overall role and function of the ECJ. 
This means that any procedure suggested would still have to be in accordance 
with the procedures existent at the moment. 
 The most plausible solution would be to allow the European Commission 
to have a case reviewed by the ECJ. The European Commission would be the 
natural institution to be in charge of this since it would be the institution rep-
resenting the EU before the ECtHR and would thus be familiar with the case. 
Moreover, the initiation of judicial review would be a power which the Com-
mission already has under Article 263(2) TFEU. Thus an extension of this 
86. Art. 4(3) of CDDH-UE(2011)04, cited supra note 1.
87. EC working document DS 1930/10, para 5.
88. Ibid., para 10.
89. Ibid., para 12.
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power would at first glance not conflict with the autonomy of EU law. But 
closer scrutiny reveals that this question cannot be answered that easily. 
The first issue is whether the Commission should be under an obligation to 
instigate such proceedings. This would necessitate a Treaty amendment since 
the initiation of proceedings under Article 263 TFEU is within the discretion 
of the Commission.90 Thus as far as EU law is concerned the initiation of 
proceedings would have to remain in the discretion of the Commission. This 
would have the advantage of giving the Commission an opportunity to assess 
whether such proceedings are necessary. Where the Court of Justice has already 
made pronouncements on the compatibility with fundamental rights, the Com-
mission could choose not to instigate them. The Commission would thus be 
in a position to exercise a filter function, which would chime with its role as 
the guardian of the Treaties. If the Commission failed to bring the case before 
the ECJ, the ECtHR would decide without a prior involvement of that Court. 
This would not be problematic since, as already indicated, the prior involve-
ment of the ECJ is not necessary in order to preserve the autonomy of EU law. 
The main reason for it is to give the EU courts a possibility to remedy a viola-
tion and thus to avoid a conviction. Where the EU Commission decides not to 
introduce proceedings, one can assume that the EU does not have an interest 
in being given the opportunity to remedy the violation and thus the ECtHR 
would be able to find such violation without prior involvement of the ECJ. 
There is, however, the problem of the strict time limit contained in Arti-
cle 263(6) TFEU, which provides that proceedings must be instituted within 
two months of the publication of the legal act in question. According to well-
established case law, this time limit is a matter of public policy and not subject 
to the discretion of the parties or the Court.91 The main reason for the time limit 
in Article 263(6) TFEU is legal certainty. Acts by the Union’s institutions 
should not be subject to judicial review after a certain amount of time has 
passed. By the time proceedings have reached the ECtHR, the two month 
period will inevitably have expired. The question therefore is whether this 
strict time limit stands in the way of a prior involvement of the ECJ as foreseen 
by the draft. The autonomy of EU law would be an obstacle if the nature of 
the ECJ’s functions were affected. It is recalled that in Opinion 1/91 the Court 
did not accept an extension of the preliminary reference procedure to the courts 
of the EFTA States because the answer provided by the ECJ was not to be 
binding.92 Would a dispensation with the time limit contained in Article 263 
90. Case 247/87, Star Fruit v. Commission, [1989] ECR 291.
91. Joined Cases T-121 & 151/96, Mutual Aid Administration Services, [1997] ECR II-1355; 
Case T-276/97, Guérin automobiles, [1998] ECR II-261; Case 24/69, Nebe, [1970] ECR 145; 
Case 227/83, Moussis, [1984] ECR 3133; Case C-246/95, Coen, [1997] ECR I-403.
92. Opinion 1/91, cited supra note 17, para 61.
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TFEU lead to a comparable change in the nature of the function of the ECJ? 
In view of the ECJ’s case law on Article 263(6) TFEU this would seem to be 
so. However, Article 263 TFEU is not the only procedure which allows for 
judicial review of EU acts by the ECJ. The preliminary reference procedure 
contained in Article 267 TFEU equally provides for a legality review by the 
ECJ. According to the ECJ’s decision in Textilwerke Deggendorf (TWD),93 the 
same time limit is in principle applicable in preliminary reference procedures 
concerning the validity of acts of the EU’s institutions.94 TWD concerned a 
Commission decision addressed to the Federal Republic of Germany declaring 
that State aid granted to the applicant was unlawful under the Treaties. The 
national court made a preliminary reference concerning the legality of the 
Commission’s decision after the time limit for an individual application had 
long expired. The ECJ argued that a decision not challenged under Article 263 
TFEU becomes definite against the addressee.95 The reason was to safeguard 
legal certainty.96 Despite having been made aware by the national authorities 
of the possibility of challenging the Commission’s decision under Article 263(4) 
TFEU, TWD failed to do so and challenged domestic decisions revoking the 
aid in the domestic courts instead. Its challenge was deemed inadmissible, 
since the time limit contained in Article 263(6) TFEU had expired. 
The Nachi case confirms these findings with regard to anti-dumping regu-
lations.97 The Court’s reasoning in this respect is convincing when it points to 
the dual nature of anti-dumping regulations. They are not only formally leg-
islative acts but at the same time affect an individual directly and individually. 
For the individual they are therefore equivalent to decisions so that the appli-
cation of the time limit is justified.98 At the same time it can be deduced from 
Nachi that where “normal” legislation is concerned, i.e. an act of general 
application only, this rationale would not apply. The Court emphasized that 
the time limit could only preclude a review under Article 267 TFEU where the 
individual had a possibility of challenging an act under Article 263(4) TFEU. 
As Arnull argues, it seems unlikely that the rule would normally extend to 
measures of general application.99 This is correct since the situation is different 
when it comes to legislative acts. Such acts are applicable erga omnes and are 
normally of an unlimited duration. If these acts are incompatible with funda-
mental rights (or have been adopted illegally for other reasons) they violate 
93. Case C-188/92, Textilwerke Deggendorf, [1994] ECR I-833.
94. Wegener in Calliess and Ruffert, EUV/EGV, 4th ed., Art. 267 AEUV, para 15..
95. Ibid., para 13.
96. Ibid., para 16.
97. Case C-239/99, Nachi Europe, [2001] ECR I-1197. 
98. Ibid., paras. 36–37.
99. Arnull, The European Union and its Court of Justice, 2nd ed. (OUP, 2006), p. 129.
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the rights of individuals each time they are implemented. If they were not 
challengeable for more than two months after their adoption, an illegal situa-
tion would be perpetuated. Thus the interests involved differ from those 
involved when dealing with decisions and there is thus no room for legal cer-
tainty to prevail over legality. This finding is confirmed by the more recent 
case law of the ECJ which allows challenges to be brought under Article 267 
TFEU where the applicant did not have standing to bring a case under Arti-
cle 263(4) TFEU.100 
When it comes to assessing the compatibility of the prior involvement of 
the ECJ with the autonomy of the EU legal order, the question then is whether 
in light of this case law the ECJ can be said to have jurisdiction to review the 
legality of EU legislation even where the time limit contained in Article 263(6) 
TFEU has passed. Given the case law on Article 267 TFEU discussed here, 
there is room for such an argument. However, the question remains whether 
giving the Commission a right to routinely have legislation reviewed indepen-
dent of the concrete circumstances surrounding an applicant’s standing would 
not change the nature and function of the procedure before the ECJ. Consider-
ing that a review after the expiry of the time limit contained in Article 263(6) 
TFEU is only possible in exceptional circumstances, such a right of the Com-
mission could be considered to go too far. There is thus a danger that the prior 
involvement of the ECJ cannot be effectuated without an amendment to the 
Treaties.
 A further point which might prove to be problematic with regard to the 
autonomy of EU law is that the draft provides for the EU to ensure that the 
ruling is delivered quickly. This clearly addresses a question internal to EU 
law and might thus constitute a hidden amendment to the Treaties and be in 
violation of the autonomy of EU law. However, Article 23(a) of the Statute of 
the Court already provides for an accelerated procedure before the Court of 
Justice. The Statute has the legal status of a Protocol to the Treaties and is 
therefore part of EU primary law.101 Thus an accelerated procedure is not alien 
to the Treaties as they currently stand. Its introduction in cases envisaged by 
the draft provision would therefore be possible without amending the Treaties, 
so that the provision would not constitute a hidden Treaty amendment. The 
ECJ would merely have to amend its Rules of Procedure which in Arti-
cles 104(a) and 104(b) allow for an accelerated procedure. 
The final question then is whether the ECJ’s review should be limited to 
violations of fundamental rights. According to the draft proposal, the ECtHR 
100. E.g. Case C-241/95, Accrington Beef, [1996] ECR I-6699; Joined Cases C-346 & 
529/03, Atzeni and others, [2006] ECR I-1875; in great detail Broberg and Fenger, Preliminary 
References to the European Court of Justice (OUP, 2010), pp. 213–222.
101. Cf. Art. 281 TFEU and Statute of the Court, O.J. 2010, C 83/210.
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is to afford sufficient time for the ECJ to make an assessment as to the compat-
ibility of a provision of EU law “with the Convention rights at issue”. It also 
seems to be the intention of the European Commission to have the ECJ perform 
a strictly limited review of the Union act on account of the relevant fundamen-
tal right.102 Given that the ECJ’s review would be limited to the ECHR rights 
at issue, it would allow the ECJ to decide quickly so that proceedings before 
the ECtHR would not be unduly delayed. Furthermore, the proceedings before 
the ECJ would mirror the test to be carried out by the ECtHR. However, there 
is currently no purely fundamental rights review under EU law. Articles 263 
and 267 TFEU are not limited to a review of compatibility with fundamental 
rights but are more general reviews of legality. The content of the questions is 
not limited so long as they concern the compatibility of EU legislation with 
primary law. The wording of Article 267 TFEU limits the ECJ to answering 
the questions referred to it. This would suggest that the Commission could 
limit its request, too. But this would alter the nature of the Commission’s right 
to have legislation reviewed by the ECJ and thus risks being incompatible with 
the autonomy of the EU legal order since Article 263 TFEU does not provide 
for any such limitation. It is therefore suggested that the accession agreement 
should avoid expressly limiting the ECJ’s right to review EU acts which are 
the subject of a complaint in the ECtHR. This would still allow the Commis-
sion to exercise its filter function by simply not submitting cases to the ECJ 
which it does not consider to be in violation of fundamental rights. It is more-
over recalled that in light of the ECJ’s practice of re-formulating the questions 
posed under Article 267 TFEU and its practice of deciding the questions on 
the basis of other provision than those referred to it by the national court,103 a 
limitation of its jurisdiction might not have great effect. In addition, if the ECJ 
found that the act was invalid for other reasons, this would still help to remove 
the alleged violation of fundamental rights and make a review by the ECtHR 
superfluous. It would therefore be within the purpose of the prior involvement 
of the ECJ, which is to highlight the subsidiarity of the review carried out by 
the ECtHR.
5. Conclusion
This contribution shows that accession by the EU to the ECHR raises 
 fundamental questions of constitutional significance. The task of drafting an 
102. EC Working Document DS 1930/10, para 9.
103. E.g. Cases C-280/91, Viessmann, [1993] ECR I-973, para 17; C-234/01, Gerritse, 
[2003] ECR I-5933, paras. 23–24. On this case law in general: Broberg and Fenger, Preliminary 
References to the European Court of Justice (OUP, 2010), pp. 403 et seq.
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accession agreement which would get a green light from the ECJ requires a 
difficult balancing act between the task of preserving the autonomy of the EU 
legal order and practical and political demands, which might conflict with it. 
All this makes the EU a difficult partner in negotiations. The introduction of 
the co-respondent mechanism is to be welcomed as a way of avoiding such 
conflict. However, the danger is that this mechanism is becoming so complex 
that well-intended solutions create new problems in this respect. The prior 
involvement of the ECJ, which in the eyes of this author is not required by the 
autonomy of the EU’s legal order, is a case in point. Equally importantly, the 
drafters ought to bear in mind that the overall aim of the accession is to improve 
the fundamental rights protection for individuals. This implies that any solu-
tion found must not render this protection too difficult to obtain. There is a 
danger that a political compromise might obstruct a legally clear solution, 
which would allow for an effective and speedy protection of individual fun-
damental rights.
